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Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren
and the Death of Terry v. Ohio
JanetKoven Levit

I.

INTRODUCTION

Officer Barney is a member of the Tulsa County Police
Department's drug task force. Late one night, as he is patrolling the
deserted streets on the north side of town, Officer Barney sees a young
black man driving a brand new BMW, a car which seems relatively
incongruous for the area. He becomes suspicious that this young
black man may be a drug dealer. Recalling his training for the drug
task force, he knows that unsubstantiated hunches provoked his
suspicions. He also knows that such hunches do not provide the
requisite reasonable suspicion to stop and investigate the driver for the
suspected drug crime.' But Officer Barney is resourceful. He decides
to follow the suspect closely and wait for the inevitable-wait for him
to violate one of a litany of traffic laws that govern the roads.
And then it happens. Our suspect forgets to signal a left turn,2 and
Officer Barney gains probable cause to make the traffic stop? Officer
Barney pulls the car over, approaches the car, and shines a flashlight at
the front seat. At this moment, Officer Barney may: 1) seize a bag
containing a white, powdery substance that is sitting on the front seat
in plain view; 4 2) ask the driver to get out of the car, frisk the driver,
and find drugs on his body; 5 3) search the car for weapons and find
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of Law. A.B.
1990, Princeton University; M.A. 1994, Yale University; J.D. 1994, Yale Law School.
The author would like to thank Darren Eicken and Paula Clark Murphy for their
invaluable research assistance.
1. See infra Part III, discussing the reasonable suspicion requirement of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also infra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-903 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81548 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-325 (Michie 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §
11-604 (West 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-69 (Michie 1993); WYO. STAT. § 31-5217 (1994).
3. See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118 (1986) (probable cause for a
vehicle stop is established if an officer witnesses a traffic offense); United States v.
Hamby, 59 F.3d 99, 101 (8th Cir. 1995) (same).
4. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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drugs during that protective search; 6 4) run a check on the driver's
license and license plate, determine that the car is not registered to the
driver, detain the driver and develop reasonable suspicion to continue
the investigative detention or even probable cause to arrest the
suspect; 7 5) arrest the suspect for the traffic offense and search the
suspect's body and the vehicle, including all containers in the vehicle,
pursuant to the arrest;8 or 6) after returning the license, ask the driver
for permission or consent to conduct an extensive search of the
vehicle.' Regardless of which permutation Officer Barney chooses, he
has wide latitude to structure an extensive search of the suspect's body
and vehicle. In each case, Officer Barney seizes the drugs and arrests
the suspect for possession or some other appropriate charge. After
booking our suspect, Officer Barney returns to his car to finish his
shift. He is giddy, believing that he has served law and order, and has
rid the streets of Tulsa of one more drug dealer. He has made his
fellow members of the drug task force proud.
In this hypothetical, Officer Barney has conducted what is known as
a pretextual traffic stop. It is pretextual because Officer Barney's real
motivations for making the stop, the desire to investigate for drugs,
had nothing to do with the traffic violation, the driver's failure to
signal. The traffic violation was a smokescreen, a mere facade, to
disguise Officer Barney's true motives.
The United States Supreme Court recently upheld the
constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops in United States v. Whren.'0
This Article argues that Whren signals the death of an earlier case,
Terry v. Ohio." In Terry, the Supreme Court established a twopronged test to determine if an investigative stop passed constitutional
muster. First, the traffic stop must be reasonable in its inception; that
is, the original contact between the state and the individual must be
reasonable. 12 Second, the ensuing search or seizure must be narrowly
tailored in scope to match the original reason for the stop. 3 However,
over the years, the Supreme Court greatly diluted the second prong,
making it effectively vacuous.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra notes 50-53 and
See infra notes 78-80 and
See infra notes 63-77 and
See infra notes 81-88 and
116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20.

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
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Unlike the second prong, Terry's first prong, known as the
reasonable suspicion test, remained intact. Nevertheless, in the
context of traffic stops, the circuits eventually split over the
interpretation of the reasonable suspicion standard. In Whren, the
Supreme Court settled this circuit split, and, as this Article argues, the
result was the death of Terry's first prong.
Reasoning that Whren signifies the death of Terry, this Article first
reviews the Terry decision. 4 In particular, the Article considers the
two-pronged test established in Terry5 and the subsequent cases that
diluted the second prong. 6 Next, this Article examines the circuit split
that led to the Whren decision. 17 The Article then discusses and
critically analyzes the Whren decision. 8 The critical analysis
recognizes, first, that Whren kills Terry's first prong, 9 and, second,
that much of the Whren Court's reasoning is susceptible to viable
counterarguments. 20 Finally, this Article concludes that, with the
death of Terry's first prong, drivers -and passengers have lost virtually
all of their Fourth Amendment protections.2 '
II. TERRY V. OHIO AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
IN THE WAKE OF A TRAFFIC STOP

A. Terry v. Ohio
In Terry v. Ohio the Court sanctioned the "stop-and-frisk" when
consistent with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement.22 In Terry, police officers stopped and frisked two
defendants who appeared to be loitering and planning a shoplifting
expedition. 23 During the frisk, the officer discovered concealed
weapons on defendants' bodies. 4
Defendants were charged with possession of concealed weapons.2 5
They filed a pretrial motion to suppress the weapons, relying on the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts IV - VI.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-20.

23. Id. at 5-6.
24. Id. at 7.

25. Id.
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Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 26 Specifically, defendants argued that the officer lacked
probable cause to stop them, and thus any ensuing search was per se
unreasonable.2 7 In other words, the defendants argued that the stopand-frisk was tantamount to a search and seizure and therefore
probable cause was a predicate. The state countered by arguing that the
stop-and-frisk fell outside the confines of the Fourth Amendment and
therefore was not susceptible to the probable cause threshold. The
Ohio trial court denied the motion, the court of appeals affirmed, and
the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.28 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to explore the constitutionality of the "stopand-frisk. '29 The Court held that, although the Fourth Amendment
governed the stop-and-frisk, reasonableness, as distinct from probable
cause, was the constitutional bulwark.30 On the basis of
reasonableness, the actions in Terry did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.3 '
Reasonableness, according to the Court, was a two-pronged
inquiry. First, was the search or seizure reasonable in its inception? In
answering this question, the Court recognized and balanced the
individual and state interests at stake. The state interest, according to
the Court, is the need to prevent and deter crime with maximally
efficient flexibility.32 The individual interests, on the other hand, are
protection from state infringement on privacy and personal security.3 3
In defining the first prong of the reasonableness standard, the Court
attempted to forge a fair, but inevitably precarious, balance between
these two interests.
Thus, officers must be able to justify intrusions into the "protected
interests" of private citizens by pointing "to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion., 34 Alternatively stated: "[W]ould
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
26. Id.
27. Id. at 7-8.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 19-20.
3 1. Id. at 22-23.
32. Id. at 22. The Court noted that "in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and
dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible
responses." Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 24-25.
34. Id. at 21.
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action taken was appropriate? '35 The Court further cautioned that
police conduct based upon inarticulable hunches erodes the protections
of the Fourth Amendment.36 With regard to the particular facts in
Terry, the Court concluded that the officer had observed "a series of
acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together
warranted further investigation," thus making the officer's conduct
reasonable. 37 This first prong has evolved into a well-entrenched
reasonable suspicion requirement.38
After answering the first question, the Court then asked whether the
search was reasonable in its scope and intensity, emphasizing that any
search must "be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify
its initiation., 39 The Court identified the primary "exigency" in Terry
as police officer safety and held that a frisk is reasonable if "a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger."40 Given the
specific facts of Terry, the scope of the search was reasonable because
the officer "confined his search strictly to what was minimally
necessary to learn whether the men were armed ...[h]e did not
conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal
activity he might find."'"
B. Terry's Second Prong
While the Court articulated a clear, two-pronged test in Terry, the
Court subsequently diluted the second prong, making it effectively
vacuous. Specifically, since Terry, the Supreme Court has held that,
when an officer stops an automobile for a traffic violation, the officer
may legitimately conduct one of several searches or seizures. The
officer may: 1) conduct a protective search of the driver, passengers,
and car;42 2) seize items in plain view;4 3 3) search the driver pursuant
to an arrest;44 4) prolong the investigative detention to facilitate
investigation of the driver's license and the vehicle registration; 45 and
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
See infra Part III, discussing the reasonable suspicion requirement of Terry.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 30.
See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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5) conduct a consensual search.46 Using any permutation of these
techniques, an officer can legally conduct a rather comprehensive
search of an automobile and its occupants, provided that the stop, the
initial reason for the officer coming into contact with the driver or the
car, passes constitutional muster. The following section highlights the
breadth and force of an officer's search and seizure powers in the
wake of a traffic stop.
First, an officer may conduct a protective search of the driver and
the car. This search derives from Terry itself, but subsequent cases
have broadened its scope. 47 Terry's stop-and-frisk principles are
pertinent in the traffic stop context because traffic stops are analogous
to Terry stops. 48 The frisk or protective search in Terry was more
limited than a full-fledged search because it was necessarily tailored
narrowly to search for weapons that could harm the stopping officer.49
In the context of an automobile stop, Michigan v. Long5" extended
Terry's sanction of the protective search to include a limited search of
the automobile's interior.5 ' A protective sweep of an automobile's
interior includes not only the passenger compartment itself but also all
containers in that area. 2 If, while conducting a search for weapons,
an officer discovers contraband other than weapons, the Fourth
Amendment does not require him to ignore the contraband.5 3 Thus, an
officer may implicitly search for drugs while conducting a protective
search of an automobile.
Furthermore, upon a legitimate stop, the officer may conduct a
protective search (a frisk) of the driver and passengers. In
46. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 50-57.
48. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
49. Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26.
50. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
51. Id. at 1051. In this case, police officers stopped to investigate when a car swerved
into a ditch. The defendant exited his car to meet the officers. The defendant did not
produce his license and registration at the officer's initial request, but instead started
walking towards the car. The officers followed him and noticed a hunting knife on the
floorboard of the car. The officers subjected the defendant to a patdown search. They
found no weapon but proceeded to shine the flashlight into the car, where they spotted
an open pouch of marijuana protruding from the armrest of the front seat. They
immediately searched the car and found no more drugs, but when the vehicle was
impounded, the police found marijuana in the trunk. Id. at 1035-36.
52. Id. at 1049 (discussing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and holding
that a protective search extends to any area in the interior of the automobile from which
the arrestee might reach for a weapon, including not only the passenger compartment,
but also any closed containers therein). See also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
573 (1991) (holding that passenger compartment includes glove compartment).
53. Long, 463 U.S. at 1050.
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Pennsylvaniav. Mimms5a the Court concluded that a protective search
of a driver following a legitimate traffic stop was reasonable."
However, Terry frisks are justified for purposes of police officer
protection, and the use of a frisk to conduct a general search for
evidence is unconstitutional.5 6 Nonetheless, as noted in Michigan v.
Long, officers need not ignore incriminating contraband evidence
discovered during a legitimate protective search, but such evidence is
only admissible if the incriminating nature of the contraband is
immediately apparent."
Second, the officer may seize items in plain view without a
warrant. 58 The plain view doctrine only justifies seizure if "the initial
intrusion which brings the police within the plain view of such an
article," is itself consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 59 To come
within the plain view exception, "a container must so clearly announce
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency,
or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. '' 60 The use
of a flashlight to illuminate the interior of a vehicle does not vitiate the
functioning of the plain view doctrine because when driving or parked
on a public road, courts discount individual expectations of privacy.6'
54. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
55. Id. at 111-12. The Court reasoned that a protective search was justified when an
officer pulled an arrestee over for an expired license plate. The officer asked the
defendant to step out of the car and noticed a bulge under his jacket. Id. at 107-12.
56. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (stating that,
because police protection was not needed, a search of the defendant's car was
unconstitutional).
57. Id. at 374. The Court concluded that a search and seizure of cocaine vials found on
the defendant during a protective search was invalid because the nature of the contraband
was not immediately apparent. Id. at 378. Upon conducting the frisk, the officers
encountered a lump in the defendant's pocket and used that lump to justify a continued
search, eventually finding and seizing the cocaine. Id. Because the lump's identity was
not "immediately apparent," the continued search for contraband exceeded the scope of a
legitimate Terry frisk and therefore exceeded the bounds of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
378-79.
58. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484-90 (1971) (holding that
police may seize evidence in plain view as long as the discovery of the evidence is
inadvertent), overruled in part by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
59. Id. at 465-66. See also Horton, 496 U.S. 128; Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983).
60. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
61. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (holding that shining a
flashlight into a barn suspected of containing chemicals used to make drugs did not
constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). See also, e.g., United
States v. Ortiz, 63 F.3d 952, 954 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that shining a flashlight
into a car, in which there was an underage passenger, to check for alcohol was within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment).
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Some courts include a "plain smell" counterpart to the "plain view"
doctrine. Thus, if an officer smells marijuana emanating from the car,
his seizure of the marijuana would be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.62
Third, if the officer decides to arrest the driver for the traffic
offense, as he is able to do with unfettered discretion in twenty-six
states 63 and subject to minimal constraints in sixteen states, 64 the
officer may conduct a search pursuant to the arrest. In Chimel v.
Califomia,65 the Supreme Court authorized warrantless searches of the
62. See, e.g., United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1310 (5th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that where a border patrol agent smelled marijuana coming from a car
stopped at a checkpoint, the agent had probable cause to search the car for illegal drugs);
United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 494 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding no
distinguishing difference between looking inside a vehicle for items in plain view and
leaning down and smelling marijuana coming from the trunk).
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (warrantless arrest allowed
when officer has probable cause to believe violation committed in his presence and
probable cause to believe person to be arrested committed the offense); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-2104 (1991) (officer has discretion to arrest or issue citation for misdemeanor motor
vehicle offenses); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39: 5-25 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996) (officer may
arrest without warrant any person committing motor vehicle violation in or out of
officer's presence); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(a) (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996)
(warrantless arrest permitted if misdemeanor committed or ordinance violated in
presence of officer). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883 (1989 & Supp. 1995);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-106 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
54-if (a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15 (West 1996); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-23 (Harrison 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-5 (1994); IDAHO CODE §
19-603 (1987 & Supp. 1996); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107-2 (West 1992 & Supp.
1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.7 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 704 (West 1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (1994 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 544.216 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.795 (1993); N.H.
REV. STAT. § 594:10(I)(a) (1986 & 1995 Supp.); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1)(a)
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183 (1993); 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6304 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-3 (1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6701d (West 1977 & Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (1995 & Supp. 1996); W.
VA. CODE § 15-5-18 (1995); WYO. STAT. § 31-5-1204 -1205 (1994).
64. ALA. CODE § 32-1-4 (1989) (when any person arrested for motor vehicle
misdemeanor, officer shall release upon written bond to appear, unless officer has good
cause to believe person has committed any felony, or person charged with offense
resulting in injury or death or offense of DWI); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-122-3 (Michie
1994) (officer must issue summons with five exceptions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
1115.1(A) (West 1996) (officer shall release upon written promise to appear, person
committing misdemeanor traffic offense, except in certain instances; see also ALASKA
STAT. § 12.25.180(B) (Michie 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-2-4 (Burns 1992); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015(2) (Baldwin 1985); MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 26-202(a) (2)
(1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.91 (West
1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-684 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-07-07, 09 (1995); OR.
REV. STAT. § 810.410 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-25-30 (Law. Co-Op. 1996); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-33-2 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118(b)(1) (1996);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.63.020 (West Supp. 1996).
65. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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arrestee and the area within his immediate control. 66 Two underlying
justifications originally supported Chimel: 1) the search assured the
safety of the arresting officer; and 2) the search maintained the integrity
of any relevant evidence.67
69
Later, in United States v. Robinson68 and Gustafson v. Florida,
the Supreme Court severed the search incident to an arrest from the
safety and evidentiary concerns addressed in Chimel. Robinson and
Gustafson held that the power to search derived from the authority to
arrest itself and not from any particular, case-specific circumstances.70
Otherwise, an officer's authority to search would be based on post hoc
judicial determinations of "the probability in a particular arrest situation
that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of
the suspect."'"
Significantly, the arrests in Robinson and Gustafson derived from
traffic-like offenses, the defendant in the former driving with a
suspended operator's permit 72 and the defendant in the latter driving
without a license. 73 The Court has not differentiated between arrests
for traffic violations and arrests for more serious offenses. Thus, the
authority to search pursuant to an arrest is constant among all offenses,
including traffic offenses.74 Most recently, in New York v. Belton75
the Court held that in every instance in which a "policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
66. Id. at 762-63.
67. Id. at 763.
68. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
69. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
70. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 263-64. Justice Powell in his
concurrence in Robinson emphasized the essential premise of the decision. He
explained:
No reason then exists to frustrate law enforcement by requiring some
independent justification for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This
seems to be the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full search of the person,
even if that search is not narrowly limited by the twin rationales of seizing
evidence and disarming the arrestee.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 237.
71. Id. at 235.
72. Id. at 220.
73. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 261.
74. Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth
Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 221, 230 (1989) (arguing in favor of distinguishing between arrests for traffic
offenses and arrests for other offenses, but conceding that the Court has not drawn such
distinctions).
75. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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compartment of that automobile. 76 This search of the passenger
compartment includes any containers found therein.77
Fourth, as part of the legitimate investigative detention in the wake
of a traffic stop, an officer may investigate the driver's license and the
vehicle registration.7" If, during the investigation of the driver's
license and the vehicle registration, the officer develops reasonable
suspicion "of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious
crime," he may continue the investigative detention and ask questions
directed at drug-related suspicions.7 9 Reasonable suspicion is not
based on any one factor but rather on the totality of the
circumstances.8 0 Questioning during the drug-related detention may
generate information sufficient to support probable cause to search for
evidence of a more serious crime or even arrest for a more serious
crime.
Finally, following a legitimate auto stop, the officer may ask for
consent to search the vehicle and thus conduct a consensual search.8,
Sometimes officers ask for consent to circumvent the strictures of the
warrant requirement.8 2 More often, the officers ask for consent
because there is no other legitimate basis for conducting the search.83
A consensual search is constitutional if it is voluntary: if it is the
product of an "essentially free and unconstrained choice. 8 4 In
assessing voluntariness, the Court borrowed the pre-Miranda v.
Arizona 5 approach to coerced confession cases, 6 holding that the
76. Id. at 460.
77. Id. (concluding that the search of defendant's jacket in automobile's interior was
proper despite low probability that jacket (container) contained drugs or weapons).
78. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657-59 (1979) (noting that license checks
permitted on vehicle stops upon reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation). See also,
e.g., United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
926 (1992); United States v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Johnson, 58
F.3d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 348 (1995); United States v.
Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995).
79. Jones, 44 F.3d at 872 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1983)
(plurality opinion)).
80. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)); Rusher, 966 F.2d at 875; United States v. Johnson,
58 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 348 (1995). See also infra notes
170-72 and accompanying text.
81. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
82. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 8.1, at 596 (1996).
83. Id. at 597.
84. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
85. 384 U.S. 436 (1969).
86. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964).
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inquiry is factual and depends on the totality of the circumstances.87
While "knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a factor to be taken
into account," it is not determinative of consent.88
While officers enjoy broad authority to conduct searches and
seizures in the wake of a traffic stop, the decisions discussed above
did not fundamentally alter the standard governing the initiation of
contact between the police and the driver, between the state and the
individual. The aforementioned Supreme Court decisions rested on a
common assumption that the police officer legitimately came into
contact with the individual, that reasonable suspicion served as a
bulwark, as a formidable threshold, between the state's interests and
individual rights.
A reasonable suspicion requirement prevents the state from
stopping individuals based merely upon whims, hunches, suspicions,
and prejudices. Thus, while greatly diluting Terry's second prong, the
line of decisions described above preserved the integrity of Terry's
first prong, which requires reasonable suspicion as a minimum
predicate to any investigative detention. Judicial sanction of pretextual
traffic stops threatens this limited protection.

III. THE PRETEXTUAL STOP PROBLEM:
THE "WOULD" VERSUS "COULD" TESTS
An examination of the two judicial standards for pretextual traffic
stops demands an understanding of the chronology of such a stop.
Recall the hypothetical in the introduction of this Article. In that
87. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233, 248-49. Factors relevant to the voluntariness
inquiry are: false claim of authority to search, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
548-49 (1968) (falsely claiming that search warrant authorized regardless of consent);
coercive surroundings, including number of police officers, United States v. SanchezValderuten, 11 F.3d 985, 990 (10th Cir. 1993), aff'd sub nom. State v. Bumpek, 275
S.E.2d 456 (N.C. 1969), United States v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358, 361 (6th Cir. 1988),
United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 1973); whether weapons
were displayed, United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1994), United States
v. Brooks, 2 F.3d 838, 842 (8th Cir. 1993), United States v. Rice, 995 F.2d 719, 724
(7th Cir. 1993), United States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 980 (1992); whether the person who consented was in police custody,
United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 920 (5th Cir. 1978), although custody alone is
insufficient to demonstrate coercion, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424
(1976); and whether the defendant was mentally or intellectually able to consent, United
States v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that the defendant "had no
formal education"), United States v. Rodriguez, 525 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1975)
(noting that the defendant did not understand English), United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d
499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (extreme emotional distress), United States v. Elrod, 441 F.2d
353, 356 (5th Cir. 1971) (mental incapacity).
88. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249.
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Diagram I.
Anatomy of Pretextual Auto Stop

A. Officer lacks reasonable
suspicion to stop car for drugs
I
I
B. Reasonable suspicion (probable cause)
to stop for traffic violation
(failure to signal)

C. Stop for traffic violation
(failure to signal)

D. Search for drugs:
- plain view
protective search of passengers
and passenger compartment
• search pursuant to arrest
* develop reasonable suspicion in process
of checking driver's license and vehicle
registration; detain for further questioning;
develop probable cause for arrest and/or search
• consent to search
I
I
E. Seize drugs and arrest
for possession
I
I
F. Motion to suppress drugs
in trial for drug crime
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hypothetical, Officer Barney conducted a pretextual traffic stop, which
has a unique anatomy, as depicted in Diagram I.
(See Diagram I: Anatomy of Pretextual Auto Stop)
The pretextual traffic stop began when Officer Barney became
suspicious that the driver was involved in drug trafficking but knew
that he lacked the particularized reasonable suspicion necessary to
make the stop to investigate his drug-related hunches (Step A).
However, because he witnessed the traffic offense, Officer Barney had
reasonable suspicion, even probable cause, to stop the car for failing to
signal (Step B). He stopped the car for the traffic violation (Step C),
seized the car and driver, and then searched the car and driver using
one of the methods described in Part I.B. (Step D). Officer Barney
found drugs, seized the drugs, and arrested (seized) the driver (Step
E). The defendant then moves to suppress the drugs (Step F), arguing
that the stop is unconstitutionally pretextual.
Notably, Officer Barney conducted several searches and seizures. In
stopping the car for the traffic violation, he seized the car and its
occupants; he seized evidence (drugs) following his search for drugs;
and he ultimately seized the driver via the arrest. These searches and
seizures fall squarely within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. To
pass constitutional muster, by the very language of the Fourth
Amendment, the initial seizure, the initial traffic stop, must be
reasonable. 9
In determining the reasonableness of Officer Barney's actions, a
paradox emerges. On the one hand, Officer Barney is a good guy. He
is a police officer who is enforcing the law, a traffic ordinance, as
promulgated by a state or local legislative body. His actions are not
only technically justified, but also bear the imprimatur of a
democratically enacted traffic law. On the other hand, Officer Barney
is a bad guy. The initial stop is a mere pretext to effect an investigative
seizure and an ensuing search on less than reasonable suspicion,
something which is patently illegal under Terry v. Ohio and its
progeny. 9° Which personality controls our examination of the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness inquiry?
The United States Courts of Appeals developed two approaches for
determining when pretextual use of police power violates the Fourth
Amendment, thereby tainting evidence seized in its wake. 9' The first,
89. U.S.

CONST. amend. IV.
90. See infra Part V.
91. Compare United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995), with United States v.
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called the "would" approach, asks whether a reasonable officer would
have made the stop absent ulterior motives.92 The second, the "could"
approach, asks only whether a reasonable officer could have made the
stop.93 Before examining these approaches, however, it is useful to
explore a third possibility-the purely subjective approach.
Under a purely subjective test, courts would ask: Was the officer
stopping the vehicle because of a hunch that more serious illegal
activity was transpiring? Were the subjective intentions of the officer at
the time of the stop pretextual? If the courts answered either of these
questions in the affirmative, then the stop would be labeled
unreasonable, violative of the Fourth Amendment, and the fruits of
any ensuing search or seizure would be excluded.94 If the core
concern with pretextual stops is that officers' ostensible motives
(traffic stop) do not match ulterior motives (search for evidence to
substantiate hunches of serious criminal activity), then logic requires a
direct look at the nature of those officers' motives.
However, most commentators 95 and courts 96 concede that the
Supreme Court foreclosed this approach in a triad of cases: Scott v.
United States, 97 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,98 and Maryland
Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2529 (1995). See
also infra note 94.
92. See infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text, analyzing the "would" standard.
93. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text, analyzing the "could" standard.
94. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647-50, 655 (1961) (extending Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and holding that evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in state courts as well as federal courts); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914) (holding that evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in federal courts).
95. Laurie A. Buckenberger, Note, Pretextual Arrests: In United States v. Scopo The
Second Circuit Raises the Price of a Traffic Ticket (Considerably), 61 BROOK. L. REV.
453, 467-72 (1995); Scott Campbell, Comment, United States v. Ferguson: The Sixth
Circuit Adds a Third Test for Pretextual Police Conduct, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 289-92
(1995); Andrew J. Pulliam, Note, Developing a Meaningful Fourth Amendment
Approach to Automobile Investigatory Stops, 47 VAND. L. REV. 477, 495-99 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515; United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037,
1040 (7th Cir. 1989).
97. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). In Scott, the electronic surveillance system in question
intercepted all the phone calls on a phone line for a given period in the face of a statute
requiring that law enforcement officials minimize the interception of communications.
Id. at 131-32. The Supreme Court upheld the wiretap search as objectively reasonable,
despite the fact that the investigators admitted they had no intent to comply with the
minimally intrusive requirements of the order. Id. at 143. The Court concluded that the
behavior was objectively reasonable given the order's parameters: "[Tihe fact that the
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Id. at 138.
98. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). Customs officials boarded a vessel for purposes of
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v. Macon.99 These cases rest on the concern that subjective inquiries
are inevitably difficult to substantiate, given that they hinge upon the
credibility of the stopping officers' testimony. This rationale is sound
and should be followed.
Nonetheless, the Court's elimination of the purely subjective test did
not solve the pretext puzzle. If Scott and its progeny mandate
objective inquiries, what constitutes an objective inquiry? In
answering this question the courts inescapably focused on the
application of one of two possible objective tests: what would a
reasonable officer do in similar circumstances, or what could an officer
do? Recent case law in the Tenth Circuit will serve as a window
through which to examine these two approaches.
Until December 5, 1995, United States v. Guzman'0° governed the
issue of pretextual traffic stops in the Tenth Circuit. In Guzman, the
police officers ostensibly stopped the defendant for not wearing a seat
belt, but the progression of the stop clearly suggests that the officer's
true ulterior motive was to search for drugs.' ' After convincing the
defendants to sign a consent-to-search form," 2 the officers searched
the car, found cocaine, and consequently charged the defendants with
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.'0 3 The defendants filed
a motion to suppress, and the district court granted the motion after
entertaining defendants' allegations of pretext from a wholly subjective
vantage point.l14
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit explored the issue of pretextual traffic
stops, examining when a stop becomes unconstitutionally pretextual.
inspecting documentation, as they were statutorily authorized to do. Id. at 583. There
was evidence that the agents were interested in investigating suspected drug activity.
The Court held that subjective intentions of officers were, under United States v. Scott,
irrelevant in the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Id.
99. 472 U.S. 463 (1985). An officer purchased obscene material with marked money,
with the subjective intent to gain evidence of violations of Maryland's obscenity laws.
Id. at 465. The respondent argued that this purchase was a warrantless seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id at 466. The Court held that the purchase was a
"transaction in the ordinary course of business," id. at 471, and not a seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court bolstered its conclusion by citing
Scott for the proposition that the identification of a Fourth Amendment violation
"'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time' and not on the officer's actual state of mind
at the time the challenged action was taken." Id. at 470 (quoting Scott, 436 U.S. at 136,
138, and 139 n.13).
100. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 1514.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1514-15.
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The Tenth Circuit first concluded that the Supreme Court's previous
decisions had foreclosed subjective review. The court further
concluded that pretext must be judged by an objective standard." 5
Objectivity, however, was not a self-defined term, and the Tenth
Circuit struggled over what type of objective standard to apply,
ultimately concluding that evidence seized during traffic stops is
inadmissible unless a reasonable officer would have made the stop
absent the ulterior motive.' °6 In terms of the opening hypothetical, if a
reasonable officer in Officer Barney's position would not have stopped
the vehicle for failure to use a turn signal absent suspicions regarding
drugs, then the stop is unconstitutionally pretextual, and the drug
evidence should be suppressed in the drug offense case.
In arriving at this standard, the Tenth Circuit in Guzman balanced
two competing interests.'0 7 The first is police autonomy. 0 8 The
second is curbing arbitrary police action.' 0 9 By focusing on an
officer's deviation from usual practices, the Tenth Circuit
simultaneously observed the Supreme Court's admonition against
subjective inquiries into police officers' states of mind and preserved
meaningful judicial review of discretionary police action." 0 In
105. Id. at 1515.
106. Id. at 1517.
107. Id. at 1516.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Court stated:
[A]n objective test that asks no more than whether some set of facts might
justify a given stop would permit arbitrary intrusions in situations such as
traffic stops. Under such a test, thousands of everyday citizens who violate
minor traffic regulations would be subject to unfettered police discretion as to
whom to stop. To paraphrase one commentator, in the absence of standardized
police procedures that limit discretion, whether we are simply allowed to
continue on our way with a stern look, or instead are stopped and subjected to
lengthy and intrusive interrogation when we forget to wear our seat belts,
turns on no more than "the state of the digestion of any officer who stops us
or, more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of our automobiles, the
formality of our dress, the shortness or our hair or the color of our skin."
Id. (quoting Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 416 (1974)).
110. Other Tenth Circuit cases that follow the approach adopted in Guzman include:
United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 1004, 1005 (10th Cir. 1993) (following Guzman and
holding "[wlhether the officers were otherwise suspicious about defendant's activity is
irrelevant, so long as a reasonable officer would have stopped defendant under the
circumstances"); United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118, 121-22 (10th Cir. 1990)
(following Guzman); United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 1989)
(same).
The Guzman court relied heavily on Eleventh Circuit precedent in reaching its
conclusion. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986) (defendant's
weaving once into emergency lane provided only a pretextual reason for stop because
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applying this standard, typically called the "would" standard, courts
examine "usual practices" in police departments."' These include
testimony by the stopping police officer indicating that he routinely
stops drivers for such violations, ' 2 and formal and informal police
regulations.' 13
The Tenth Circuit overruled Guzman in United States v. BoteroOspina. 14 In that case, a police officer observed the defendant swerve
over the center line and swerve back into the outside lane, an act that
allegedly aroused suspicion that the defendant was falling asleep or
driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol." 5 During the course
of the stop, the defendant's answers to questions regarding his license
and vehicle registration aroused the officer's suspicions.' 16 This
prompted the officer to ask the defendant if he was carrying weapons
or drugs.'
When the defendant answered negatively, the officer
asked to search his car, and the defendant consented.1 8 The officer
then found 74 kilograms of cocaine." 9 The defendant moved for
suppression, arguing that the traffic stop was pretextual.' 2 ° The
district court denied the motion and convicted the defendant., 2 ' On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit sua sponte moved to review en banc the

officer would not have made stop in absence of invalid purpose); see also United States
v. Harris 928 F.2d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 1991) (following Smith and "would" approach);
United States v. Stickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); and United States
v. Bates, 840 F.2d 858, 860 (11th Cir. 1988) (same).
The Ninth Circuit also followed the "would" approach. See United States v. Hernandez,
55 F.3d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We focus on the objective facts and ask whether a
reasonable officer, given the circumstances, would have made the stop absent a desire to
investigate an unrelated serious offense."); United States v. Millan, 36 F.3d 886, 888
(9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] stop is pretextual unless a 'reasonable officer,' given the same
circumstances, 'would have made the stop anyway, apart from [his or her] suspicions
about other more serious criminal activity."') (quoting United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d
472. 476 (9th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Lillard, 929 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that stop for speeding is not pretextual because stopping officer would have
stopped the car despite his hunch).
11l. See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text. This "would" standard is also
known as the "modified objective standard." Pulliam, supra note 95, at 485.
112. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
114. 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
115. Id. at 785.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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pretext issue, 11 2 revisiting the proper standard for determining whether
a traffic stop is unconstitutionally pretextual.
The Tenth Circuit held that as long as the officer could root his
actions in a concrete statute, regulation, or ordinance, as long as the
officer could have made this stop because the vehicle swerved over the
center line, then there is no Fourth Amendment violation. 2 3 In other
words, "if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the
police officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or
equipment violation has occurred or is occurring," the stop passes
constitutional muster. 24 Another court articulated the "could" standard
as follows:
When an officer observes a traffic offense-however minor-he
has probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle ....

[T]his

otherwise valid stop does not become unreasonable merely
because the officer has intuitive suspicions that the occupants of
the car are engaged in some sort of criminal activity...

[T]hat

stop remains valid even if the officer would25 have ignored the
traffic violation but for his other suspicions.'
The key issue under the "could" test is legitimacy rather than
reasonableness: 1) Does the officer have probable cause to make the
stop for a particular traffic violation?; and 2) Is there a municipal
ordinance or state law that legitimates the stop? On the eve of the
Whren decision, the overwhelming majority of circuits had adopted the
"could" approach.'26
122. Id.
123. Id. at 787.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1990)).
126. See Whren, 53 F.3d at 375 (involving a traffic stop for failure to signal and
speeding); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782 (2nd Cir. 1994) (holding that the
police require only probable cause to make a traffic stop regardless of whether or not
they would have done so absent investigatory motives), rev'g 814 F. Supp. 292
(E.D.N.Y. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d
242, 247 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that as long as a traffic stop is authorized by
Pennsylvania law, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2528 (1996) ; United States v. Hassen El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding
traffic stop made by officer even if the "officer would not have made the stop but for
some hunch"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994); United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d
109, 111 (6th Cir. 1994) (following United States v. Ferguson 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir.
1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 258 (1994);
Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391 ("[S]o long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not unlawful and
does not violate the Fourth Amendment."); United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064, 1065
(7th Cir. 1991) (adopting "could" standard in conjunction with discussion of pretextual
arrests rather than pretextual stops), cert. denied sub nom. Cummins v. United States,
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IV. THE WHREN DECISION

The Supreme Court resolved the debate over the appropriate car stop
standard in United States v. Whren."' Plainclothes police officers in
an unmarked car patrolled a "high drug area" in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area on the evening of June 10, 1993.12' They became
suspicious of drug activity upon passing a dark Pathfinder truck with
502 U.S. 962 (1991); United States v. Myers, 990 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating
that a stop for following too closely behind another car is not a pretextual stop); United
States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the "stop remains
valid even if the officer would have ignored the traffic violation but for his other
suspicions"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991) ; United States v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815,
819 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (although not a traffic stop case, stating that an arrest is
valid so long as the police do what "they are objectively permitted to do" without regard
to usual practices).
However, many of the decisions that the courts characterized as unequivocal "could"
cases can actually be distinguished. Recall the definition of pretext: lacking reasonable
suspicion or probable cause for a suspected crime, a police officer stops a car for a traffic
violation for which he has probable cause in an effort to obtain evidence to meet the
reasonable suspicion or probable cause standard for another suspected crime. In some of
the "pretext" cases where the courts address the "would" versus "could" issue, the courts
held that the police had independent reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for the
more serious crime. In other words, a pretextual stop did not occur, and the discussion of
pretext in the text is dicta. See United States v. Stapleton, 10 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir.
1993) (upon anonymous tip that car was carrying drugs, the police followed suspect's
car and stopped the suspect when car reached 70-75 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone,
irrelevant that officers may not have ordinarily stopped the car for only exceeding the
speed limit by 5 to 10 m.p.h.); Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993) (police stopped the
car, after observing in parking lot, for not having a visible driver's license plate, but
court found that police had independent, reasonable suspicion of drug activity); United
States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1987) (suspect stopped for passing a bus,
crossing the double yellow line, and running a red light, but police had independent
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in drug activity); but see United
States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 111 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (relying solely on the
reasoning of Ferguson, which is not a true pretext case, holding as long as traffic
violations occurred, stop was not pretextual), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 258 (1994).
In other cases, courts explicitly state that they will follow the "could" standard, but, in
applying that standard, they utilize Guzman-type analysis, relying on the officer's
testimony regarding tendency to stop cars for particular offenses. In United States v.
Rivera, 906 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1990), for example, the police stopped the defendant for
erratic driving and obstruction of the dashboard. Although the court stated that a "could"
standard should govern, it heavily weighed the findings of the district court that the
officer would have stopped the car to issue the citation on the obstruction charge and
would have stopped the car to investigate possibly dangerous or intoxicated driving
upon seeing the erratic behavior. Id. at 321. Thus, under the guise of a "could" case, the
Seventh Circuit relied on "would" reasoning. But see Trigg, 925 F.2d at 1065 (adopting
"could" standard in conjunction with discussion of pretext in the context of initial
decision to arrest rather than initial decision to stop the vehicle); United States v. Trigg,
878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
127. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
128. Id. at 1772.
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temporary license plates and youthful occupants. 29 After the driver
looked into the lap of the passenger, the police made a U-turn, heading
back toward the Pathfinder. 30 Then the Pathfinder made a sudden
right turn, without signaling, and proceeded at an "unreasonable
speed."'' The police officers then stopped the vehicle for various
traffic code violations. 32 Upon approaching the driver's door, one
officer observed in plain view two large plastic bags of what appeared
to be crack cocaine. 133 The bags in plain view gave the officers
probable cause to arrest the driver and passenger and search the
Pathfinder.
The officers found several types of illegal drugs during the
34
search.
Petitioners were charged with violations of several federal drug
laws. In response they moved to suppress the confiscated drug
evidence, arguing that the traffic stop had been illegal. 135 Specifically,
they asserted that the officers' purported basis for stopping the vehicle
was unconstitutionally pretextual. 136 Petitioners based their motion in
great part on the fact that District of Columbia police regulations
"permit plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles to enforce traffic
laws 'only in the case of a violation that37 is so grave as to pose an
immediate threat to the safety of others."",1
The district court denied the motion to suppress, relying on wouldtest-like reasoning to sanction the stop: "[t]here was nothing to really
demonstrate that the actions of the officers were contrary to a normal
traffic stop.' 38 The court concluded that the police would have made
the stop absent the ulterior motives. The court of appeals affirmed,
relying instead on prototypical could-type reasoning: "regardless of
whether a police officer subjectively believes that the occupants of an
automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic
stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same
129.
130.

Id.
Id.

131.

Id.

132. 18 D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 40 § 2213.4 (1995) ("An operator shall . . . give full
time and attention to the operation of a vehicle"); § 2204.3 ("No person shall turn any
vehicle . . . without giving an appropriate signal"); § 2200.3 ("No person shall drive a
vehicle . . . at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions").
133. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
134. Id.
135.

136.
137.
General
138.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 1775 (citing Metropolitan Police Department-Washington, D.C.,
Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992)).
Id. at 1772.
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circumstances
could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic
39
violation."'

The Supreme Court affirmed, embracing the "could" standard. The
Court held that probable cause to stop a vehicle for a traffic violation
justifies all subsequent searches and seizures made in its wake."4 The
Court characterized the petitioners' argument as follows: "'[I]n the
unique context of civil traffic regulations' probable cause is not enough
....[T]he Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be, not the
normal one (applied by the Court of Appeals) of whether probable
cause existed to justify the stop; but rather, whether a police officer,
acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given."''
Otherwise stated, petitioners argued that courts should engraft a
reasonableness test onto the extant test for traffic stops, namely
probable cause.
The Court rejected this position, holding that probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation is occurring per se justifies a stop
(seizure) and those ensuing searches and seizures now permissible
under Terry's second prong. 4 2 The Court recognized that certain
"extraordinary" circumstances "unusually harmful to an individual's
privacy or even physical interests" mandate subjecting even probable
cause determinations to an additional reasonableness inquiry before a
search or seizure on the basis of such probable cause receives
constitutional imprimatur. "4'However, a "run-of-the-mine" traffic
violation is not such an extraordinary circumstance. 44 Thus, after
Whren, petitioners' concession that the officers had probable cause to
make the traffic stop

145

is the beginning and end of the Fourth

Amendment inquiry.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court entertained and refuted the
common arguments in favor of the "would" standard. First, it refuted
petitioners' argument based on precedent. Petitioners anchored their
arguments in a line of cases which expressed disapproval and

139. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 690 (1996), and judgment aff'd, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996).
140. Whren, 116 S.Ct. at 1776-77.
141. Id.at 1773.
142. Id.at 1776-77; see also supra Part I1.B.
143. Id.at 1776 (citing cases such as Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S.Ct. 1914 (1995)
(unannounced entry into a home); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (seizure by
means of deadly force); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (entry into a home
without a warrant)).
144. Id.at 1777.
145. Id.at 1772.
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skepticism toward pretextual uses of police power.'" The Court
distinguished these cases because each involved an inventory search or
administrative inspection. The Court characterized inventory searches
and administrative inspections as searches made in the absence of
probable cause, and claimed that the statements upon which petitioners
relied for precedential support do not endorse the "principle that
ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the
basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of the law
occurred."' 147 The Court further noted that the statements in such cases
are mere dictum, having little to no precedential weight.'4
Second, the Court argued that while petitioners can at best rely on
faint and tangentially relevant precedential support for their position, a
line of cases squarely precludes subjective examination of police
officers' motives. 149 The Court stated that petitioners' efforts to
convince the Court that their standard was indeed an objective one
were unconvincing, noting that "although framed in empirical terms,
[petitioners'] approach is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective
considerations."' 50
Third, the Court appeared concerned about the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in the "would" standard. The Court stated that
"[w]hile police manuals and standard procedures may sometimes
provide objective assistance, ordinarily one would be reduced to
speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical
constable."' 5 ' Furthermore, the Court appeared concerned that linking
Fourth Amendment protections to52 local practices would make such
protections impracticably variant.
Fourth, the Court apparently recognized that pretextual traffic stops
leave the police with virtually unfettered discretion to stop vehicles and

146. Id. at 1773; see Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) ("[A]n inventory search
must not be used as a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating
evidence."); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (approval of an inventory
search after noting that there had been "no showing that the police, who were following
standard procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation"); New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of
an administrative inspection, noting that the search did not appear to be a "'pretext' for
obtaining evidence of ...

147.
148.
(1980)
149.
150.
151.

violation of ...

penal laws").

Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 (emphasis added).
Id. (dismissing petitioners' reliance on Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1
(per curium), because statements regarding pretext appear in mere dictum).
Id. at 1774. See also supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
Id. at 1775.

152. Id.
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conduct ensuing searches. 5 3 It further recognized that impermissible
considerations, such as race, may seep into the calculus.' 5 However,
the Court asserted that the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the
Fourth Amendment, is the appropriate vehicle through which to
combat
selective enforcement or discriminatory application of the
55
law.1
Fifth, the Court appeared cognizant of separation of powers
concerns. In response to petitioners' argument that some traffic stops,
even if based on probable cause, are violative of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court noted:
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at
what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so
commonly violated that infraction itself can no longer be the
ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even
if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by
what standard (or what right) we would decide, as petitioners
would have us do, which particular
provisions are sufficiently
56
important to merit enforcement.'
Whren, therefore, can roughly be divided into two parts: 1) the
Court's affirmative argument in support of the "could" standardnamely, probable cause for traffic violations justifies all subsequent
searches and seizures; and 2) the Court's reasons for rejecting the
"would" standard. The following sections separately critique these
components of the Court's opinion.
V. THE "COULD" STANDARD:
THE DEATH OF TERRY'S FIRST PRONG

The "would" approach comports with the Fourth Amendment. The
"could" approach does not. Simply stated, the "could" approach
clashes with the well-established Supreme Court jurisprudence that
requires reasonable suspicion as a predicate to investigative stops. The
adoption of the "could" standard, thereby blindly sanctioning
pretextual traffic stops, ignores and circumvents reasonable suspicion
and, concomitantly, undermines the purpose behind the Fourth
Amendment.
While the history of the Fourth Amendment is incredibly rich and
complex, its animating purpose appears to be curbing arbitrary use of

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 1774.
Id.
Id. at 1777.
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police power.'57 The framers authored the Fourth Amendment to
avoid the type of arbitrary and indiscriminate use of police power that
had become commonplace through use of general warrants and writs
of assistance to search colonists' homes.' 58 Reflecting on this history,
much Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evinces concern about
arbitrary use of state-sanctioned police power. 159 By condoning
Officer Barney's actions, and in essence condoning the pretextual use
of police power, courts will de facto resuscitate the general warrant
and writ of assistance.
The logic of this conclusion hinges on the assumption that we all
violate traffic laws almost every time we enter the car. Perhaps we60
drive thirty-six miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone;1
maybe we drive down the block to a friend's home without our seat
belt;161 or maybe we swerve as little as six inches over the center line
157. See generally Akil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV.
REV. 757 (1994); Amsterdam, supra note 109.
158. See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19-44
(1969); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 20, 31, 33-36
(1966); Amsterdam, supra note 109, at 412. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 583-84 (1980); Salken, supra note 74, at 254-56 (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to stem arbitrariness inherent in general warrants and writs of
assistance).
159. The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed concern about arbitrary use of
police power. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding that systematic
roadblocks do not offend the Fourth Amendment because they do not unleash unbridled
discretion of police officers); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554
(1976) (in holding that fixed checkpoints, as opposed to roving patrols, are
constitutional, the Court stated, "[T]he Fourth Amendment imposes limits on searchand-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by
enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals."); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that warrants for housing inspections
must meet articulable standards so that occupant is not subject to unbridled police
discretion).
Precisely because pretextual traffic stops strike at the Fourth Amendment's core goal
of curbing arbitrary use of police power, Professor LaFave expresses strong concern:
[G]iven the pervasiveness of such minor offenses and the ease with which law
enforcement agents may uncover them in the conduct of virtually everyone,
[the requirement of a traffic violation] hardly matters, for . . . there exists 'a
power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer,'
precisely the kind of arbitrary authority which gave rise to the Fourth
Amendment.
1 LAFAVE, supra note 82, § 1.4(e), at 123 (quoting 2 L. ROTH & H. ZOBEL, LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS, 141-42 (1965)).
160. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. 32-5A-171 (1996); ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 28-701.02
(Michie 1995) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-98 (West
1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-801a (1995).
161. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 32-5B-4 (1996); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 28.05.095
(Michie 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-1602 (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-41.4
(1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 12-417 (1995).
L.
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on the road. 62 When couched in these terms, this assumption
becomes tenable. If we accept this traffic violation as a legitimate
springboard from which to conduct the types of searches and seizures
that Officer Barney could have conducted in the opening hypothetical,
then we all become susceptible to the arbitrary whims and unsupported
hunches of police officers. We have in essence recreated a general
warrant or writ of assistance.
What if an officer disliked all men with earrings and therefore
decided to enforce esoteric traffic violations only when a glaring gold
earring sparkled through the windshield? What if an officer did not
like your looks, or the type of car you were driving, or the
neighborhood through which you were driving? Or, what if the
officer believed that women, blacks, or Hispanics were more inclined
to commit drug and firearm crimes? 63 Under the "could" approach,
the answers to these questions are irrelevant as long as the stop is
grounded in a statute.
Consider another example. It would be repugnant to American
notions of justice if our government were to allow, much like the
former South African government allowed, random stopping of
individuals on the street to check for citizenship or identification
papers. It would be equally objectionable to allow random stopping of
cars to check the validity of the driver's license and vehicle
registration, a practice that the Supreme Court explicitly invalidated in
Delaware v. Prouse.64 Our repulsion at the South African example,
like the Supreme Court's rejection of the practice of random car stops,
is motivated by a fear that unfettered discretion creates opportunity for
arbitrary and abusive uses of police power. But how different is it to
sanction stops of vehicles to conduct intrusive and extensive searches
and seizures on the basis of minor traffic violations that we all commit
every time we enter our cars? The case law demonstrates that no
meaningful distinction exists.

162. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-301 (1995).
163. See generally United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1994)
(Newman, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994). In Scopo, the court
stated:
[S]ome police officers will use the pretext of traffic violations or other minor
infractions to harass members of groups identified by factors that are totally
impermissible as a basis for law enforcement activity-factors such as race or
ethnic origin, or simply appearances that some police officers do not like,
such as young men with long hair, heavy jewelry, and flashy clothing.
Id.
164. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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In the context of a traffic stop, the courts have chosen reasonable
suspicion as the line between arbitrary and legitimate uses of police
power. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court held that reasonable suspicion was
a necessary predicate to an investigative search.165 Automobile stops
are deemed analogous to "Terry stops,' 66 and therefore Terry and its
progeny govern the constitutionality of pretextual stops. Recall that
the Court in Terry concluded that the stop and frisk satisfied the
reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment as long as "the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
caution in the belief that the action taken
warrant a man of reasonable
' 167
was appropriate."
Terry's legacy is a well-entrenched reasonable suspicion
requirement. Significantly, the Court in Terry confronted the same
competing concerns as the Supreme Court faced in Whren and the
Tenth Circuit faced in both Guzman and Botero-Ospina-balancing
enhancement of police discretion to further effective law enforcement
against containment of arbitrary police action. 68 The Terry Court
resolved this tension by giving birth to the reasonable suspicion
requirement. 69 Defined in terms of what a reasonable officer would
do under similar circumstances, defined almost identically to the
"would" test, reasonable suspicion provides a balanced check on
arbitrary police behavior.
The Court in Terry clearly demanded some type of particularized
suspicion to satisfy its standard. However, the Court deliberately did
not delineate a series of black and white, safe-harbor-type rules.
Officers may satisfy Terry's reasonable suspicion requirement by
offering specific facts and logical inferences to substantiate the reasons
for their investigatory stop. 70 These facts and inferences must be
objective and reasonable in light of a trained officer's experience. ,71
Furthermore, reasonable suspicion is a "totality of the circumstances"
test. 72 Through their confrontations with fact-bound cases, the circuit
courts developed a set of ad hoc rules from which lower courts can

165. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
166. See supra note 48.
167. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. See also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
168. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15. The Terry Court was clearly animated by concern over
"wholesale harassment" of "minority groups, particularly Negroes." Id. at 14.
169. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
170. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
171. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
172. Id.
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discern, often by imperfect analogy, whether officers satisfied the
reasonable suspicion requirements prior to stopping an automobile.
For instance, courts are increasingly accepting "drug profiles" to
satisfy reasonable suspicion requirements. A drug profile is a set of
factors established over many years by law enforcement officials to
help predict which individuals might engage in criminal activity.173
Drug profiles, upheld by the Supreme Court, have been used in the
context of airport stops. 74 The Court has never explicitly sanctioned
the use of a drug profile in the context of an automobile stop but has
implicitly sanctioned such use by viewing clusters of acts, which are
innocent in and of themselves but which are typical constituent
elements of drug profiles, as satisfying Terry's reasonable suspicion
requirement. The facts which courts apparently consider relevant
when determining whether a driver or passenger satisfies reasonable
suspicion for a drug offense include: whether multiple vehicles
traveled together, whether the route was a known drug trafficking
route, whether the vehicle was of a type commonly used to transport
drugs, whether the vehicle appeared heavily loaded, whether the driver
evaded law enforcement, and whether the driver was nervous. 175 In
173. See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulation:
The Use, Misuse and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 479 (1990).
174. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) ("A court sitting to
determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the
factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a
'profile' does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a
trained agent."). See also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Piecing together holdings from these cases, the
following facts contribute to a drug profile used to sustain airport searches: source city,
luggage peculiarities, a sudden change in travel plans, form of payment for ticket, the
match between identification and name on the ticket, veracity of facts given to the ticket
agent, and nervousness. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 82, § 9.4(e), at 166-73.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 677-79, 682 n.3 (1985)
(holding that stop for drugs based upon reasonable suspicion because location of stop
was under surveillance for drug trafficking, several vehicles typically used to transport
drugs traveled in tandem, one of the vehicles was "riding low," and vehicles attempted to
evade law enforcement). See also United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir.
1995) (reasonable suspicion based on several factors, including size of car, source and
destination cities, location of stop, defendants' reluctance to stop car, and inability to
prove authorization to operate automobile); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1556
(10th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant's shaking and nervousness support reasonable
suspicion); United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1990) (allowing
detention by patrol trooper upon driver's inability to prove lawful possession of
automobile), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991); United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d
972, 975 (10th Cir. 1989) (including failure to promptly stop an automobile as a
reasonable cause for suspicion); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891 (10th
Cir. 1986) (explaining that source and destination cities of suspects are relevant
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assessing reasonable suspicion, courts' implicit acceptance of drug
profiles, or clusters of ostensibly innocent facts, has transformed that
standard into one that is relatively easy to meet. "Suspicious"
combinations of location, vehicle appearance, and driver behavior
apparently satisfy the strictures of Terry.
Yet reasonable suspicion remained a threshold nonetheless. While
courts are increasingly using drug-profile-like clusters of facts to
satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirements, reasonable suspicion
requires more than a mere hunch'76 and cannot rest on broad profiles
which cast suspicion on entire categories of people.' 7 Neither those
decisions that expand the officers' ability to search in the wake of a
traffic stop,1T8 nor those decisions that allow drug-profile-like

characteristics to satisfy reasonable suspicion, 79 fundamentally
jeopardized the reasonable suspicion requirement. However, adoption
of the "could" standard for pretextual traffic stops does not merely
jeopardize the reasonable suspicion requirement but eliminates it.
Reconsider Officer Barney's stop in the opening hypothetical. 8 °
When one dissects Officer Barney's stop, its essence and hallmark is
that Officer Barney did not meet reasonable suspicion requirements.
Instead, he relied on unsubstantiated hunches based on the driver's
race and the make of the car. He did have reasonable suspicion, even
probable cause, to make the stop on the basis of a traffic violation that
likely would not have been of import but for his unsubstantiated
hunch. Absent a reasonable suspicion, he was able to conduct a
variety of searches and seizures, functionally conducting his
investigation for drugs during the traffic stop. The traffic stop
becomes a crafty means to circumvent Terry's reasonable suspicion
requirement. It becomes a loophole around Terry.
The courts in both Whren and Botero-Ospinaconspicuously steered
from Terry in reaching their decisions, and thus illustrate this loophole
in action. In Botero-Ospina the court recognized that traffic stops are
considerations).
176. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
177. See United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 23 F.3d 1331 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
"profile" that targeted Hispanics); United States v. Gutierrez-Rosales 53 F.3d 244 (9th
Cir. 1995) (rejecting profile targeting Mexicans). See also United States v. Tapia, 912
F.2d 1367 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (rejecting "profile" because of factors that could plausibly
describe the behavior of a large portion of motorists engaged in travel upon our
interstate highways); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418-19
(9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting "profile" because describes "too many individuals" including
"many law abiding motorists").
178. See supra Part II.B.
179. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part III, and Diagram I, Anatomy of Pretextual Auto Stop, p. 156.
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analogous to Terry stops. 8 ' Nonetheless, it did not analyze the traffic
stop under the principles of Terry. Instead, the Tenth Circuit reached
its decision by canvassing authority in other circuits,' 8 2 noting the
importance of subjective inquiries, namely by emphasizing the Scott
line of cases,' 8 3 and making blanket statements implicating Guzman
under separation of powers principles.' 8 4 The majority necessarily
abandoned Terry when it analyzed the issue because the "could"
approach, which potentially exposes almost all drivers to seizures and
searches based on mere hunches, patently violates Terry.
In Whren, the Supreme Court did not even mention that traffic stops
are analogous to Terry stops. Nor did the Court give any lip service to
Terry. Instead, the Court focused on the stop, beginning with step
B-Officer Barney has probable cause to make the stop based on a
traffic violation.185 This approach conveniently blocked step AOfficer Barney lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop for the
drug crime 86-from the Court's range of vision and permitted the
Court to write a clean, relatively uncontroversial opinion restating the
basic proposition that probable cause supports a traffic stop. Yet the
simplicity of this opinion is both elusive and specious, for the stop
began prior to step B, when Officer Barney developed an
unsubstantiated hunch that drug activity was occurring (Step A). This
is a hunch that, standing alone, he could not have corroborated
because Terry and its progeny require reasonable suspicion as a
predicate to any investigative search. Reasonable suspicion (even
probable cause) for a traffic violation becomes a surrogate for
reasonable suspicion to stop the driver for the more severe crime, call
it a suspected drug crime.
Thus, Whren turns a blind eye to circumvention of Terry's
reasonable suspicion requirement. Through inserting a traffic violation
into the process, police officers replicate that which they are unable to
accomplish directly under Terry. The "would" standard, which the
Court rejected in Whren, would have re-injected Terry into the mix.
By asking whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the
traffic offense was the proximate animus for the stop or whether it was
a subterfuge designed to circumvent the requirements of Terry, the
181. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2529 (1996).
182. Id. at 787.
183. Id. at 787-88.
184. Id. at 788.
185. See supra Part III; Diagram I, Anatomy of Pretextual Auto Stop, p. 156.
186. See supra Part III; Diagram I, Anatomy of Pretextual Auto Stop, p. 156.
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"would" standard places constraints on state action. It limits arbitrary
use of police power by explicitly borrowing the objective, reasonable
officer standard from Terry.'8 7 As such, the "would" standard is
respectful of and true to the mandate of Terry and its progeny.
Instead, Whren embraced the "could" standard, thereby sanctioning
Officer Barney's pretextual use of his police powers. In so doing,
Whren opened the door to arbitrary and whimsical use of police power
without reasonable suspicion as a protective, initial threshold.
Individuals long ago lost the protections in Terry's second prong;' 88
by ignoring Terry's mandate of reasonable suspicion, Whren destroys
much of the first prong. When cloaked with the "could" standard, the
individual driver or passenger stands naked before the state.
VI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE "WOULD" STANDARD:

MERE PRETEXTS
In reaching its conclusion in Whren, the Court also refuted
arguments in support of the "would" standard.18 9 The first is a
precedential one: the Court's own precedent mandates acceptance of
the would standard.' 9 Petitioners did not argue that the Court had
decided a case directly on point; instead, petitioners argued that a faint,
yet continual strain of allusions to pretext signaled the Court's implicit
approval of the would standard.' 9'
The Court rejected this argument by distinguishing from Whren
three cases, Florida v. Wells, 92 Colorado v. Bertine,'93 and New
York v. Burger, 94 because they involved inventory and administrative
searches which, as opposed to a traffic stop, need not be rooted in
probable cause. Of course, the Court may characterize its precedent as
it deems appropriate, and it may choose to weigh tangential statements
187. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. See also Petitioner's brief
1996 WL 75758, at 30-37; Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (1996).
191. Id. at 1773. The argument is as follows: The Court, through its history,
recognized and expressed concern about pretextual use of police power. The "could"
standard emasculates the very notion of pretext. Pretext is inextricably linked to a
tension between obstensible motives and ulterior motives. The "could" standard
dispenses with ulterior motives altogether and therefore destroys the heart and soul of
pretext. Under the "could" standard, pretext does not exist. Thus the Court cannot
consistently voice concern about pretext and also embrace the "could" standard. They
are mutually exclusive positions.
192. 495 U.S. 1 (1990); see also supra note 146.
193. 479 U.S. 367 (1987); see also supra note 146.
194. 482 U.S. 691 (1987); see also supra note 146.
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in prior opinions as it wishes. For completeness, however, it bears
noting that the Court's exploration of its own precedent was
incomplete and rather narrow.
While admittedly the Supreme Court had not decisively explored the
pretext issue within the context of a traffic stop, it has, throughout this
century, expressed disapproval of the duplicity inherent in pretextual
uses of police power beyond that of the administrative and inventory
search. On two occasions, Supreme Court Justices have suggested
that probable cause to stop an automobile for a traffic or motor vehicle
violation may not be used as a surrogate for the probable cause
necessary to search the car and passengers.'95 On other occasions, the
Court has stated that probable cause to arrest, embodied in an arrest
warrant, cannot be a substitute for the probable cause necessary to
sustain a search. 196 While the Court correctly grouped and
distinguished the aforementioned inventory/administrative cases, it
could have offered a more generic, softer, interpretationinventories/administrative searches cannot be used as a subterfuge, as
a means to circumvent those Fourth Amendment requirements attached
195. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 122 n.* (1986) (Powell, J. concurring)
(stating that although a police officer may enter a car following a valid traffic stop to
retrieve a vehicle identification number (VIN) that is not in plain view, "[a]n officer may
not use VIN inspection [a logical outgrowth of a traffic stop based on probable cause] as
a pretext for searching a vehicle for contraband or weapons"). See also Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam). In Bannister, an officer saw a car speeding
and then lost sight of the car. Id. at 2. Meanwhile, the officer heard a report of theft of
chrome auto parts. Id. The officer saw the original car again, still speeding, and stopped
the car for speeding. Id. In plain view, the officer saw the chrome auto parts and then
arrested and seized the auto parts as evidence to use in the theft case. Id. The Court held
that the officer had probable cause to arrest the car's occupants and seize the evidence.
Id. at 4. In a footnote, however, the Court noted that "[tihere was no evidence
whatsoever that the officer's presence to issue a traffic citation was a pretext to confirm
any other previous suspicion about the occupants." Id. at 4 n.4. The implication is that
if the officer's presence had been a pretext, the ensuing search may have been more
suspect.
196. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981) (noting that an arrest
warrant for one party is not a surrogate to search a third party's home and that a warrant
may not serve as a "pretext for entering a home in which the police have a suspicion, but
not probable cause to believe, that illegal activity is taking place"); Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1960) (noting that use of an INS arrest warrant as a
"subterfuge" or "sham" to search for evidence would "reveal a serious misconduct by lawenforcing officers" and must meet "stern resistance by the courts"); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (search warrant based on probable cause to arrest
for violations of prohibition laws does not serve as a substitute for requisite probable
cause to sustain a search of a home for incriminating evidence). See also United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (concurring with
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1993) (probable cause to arrest cannot be used as a
"pretext for a search actually undertaken for collateral objectives")).
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to distinct searches or seizures. 197 Past Supreme Court statements do
not control the pretextual traffic stop question, and indeed in many
cases they are pure dicta. However, taken as a whole, they suggest
that satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment requirements for one stop or
search should not become a loophole around another, equally
important, Fourth Amendment requirement. The Court's persistent
reconnaissance reflects its fear that loopholes create
room for abusive,
98
discriminatory, and arbitrary use of police power.
The Court's second argument against the "would" standard is that
the standard is not objective 9 9 and therefore violates the trilogy of
cases-Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, and Macon-that foreclose
subjective review of police officers' actions. 20 0 This argument is
simply incorrect. The "would" test asks whether a reasonable officer
would have made the traffic stop absent an infirm ulterior motive.
This test explicitly mirrors the language in Terry v. Ohio,20 ' and courts
197. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). The police stopped defendant
pursuant to a standard procedure - a roadblock to look for licenses. The officers saw a
green balloon in plain view which they suspected contained drugs. Id. at 734. They
seized the evidence, arrested the driver, and searched the vehicle. Id. at 734-35. In
holding that the seizure did not violate the inadvertence requirement of the "plain view
doctrine," the Court stated, "[tihe circumstances of this meeting between [officer and
defendant] give no suggestion that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of
narcotics violation might be uncovered in 'plain view' in the course of a check for
driver's licenses." Id. at 743. In Brown, therefore, the Court suggests that a roadblock
(administrative search) could not be substituted for the reasonable suspicion necessary
to stop a car to investigate for drugs. See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976). The police impounded an illegally parked car and inventoried its contents.
During the inventory, the police discovered marijuana. Id. at 366. The Court held that
inventories made pursuant to standard procedures are constitutional, but mentioned that
"there is no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure, essentially like that
followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an investigatory police
motive." Id. at 376. The Court here hints that an inventory search cannot be a surrogate
for the reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative search.
198. See, e.g., Steagald, 451 U.S. at 215 (noting that if an arrest warrant could serve
as a surrogate for probable cause to search a third party's home, there would be
"significant potential for abuse. Armed solely with an arrest warrant for a single person,
the police could search all the homes of that individual's friends and acquaintances.
Moreover, an arrest warrant may serve as the pretext for entering a home in which the
police have a suspicion, but not probable cause to believe, that illegal activity is taking
place.").
199. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v.
Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529
(1996); United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 388 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 97 (1994); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994); Whren, 53 F.3d at 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct.
1769 (1996).
200. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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consider Terry's standard to be an objective one. 202 Indeed, Uie
United
States v. Scott relies heavily on Terry in precluding subjective
inquiries. This reliance implicitly suggests that Terry is an objective
rather than subjective test. 2°3
Furthermore, objective standards are common in the criminal law,
and courts implement an objective approach through use of a
rea'sonable person standard. When asking whether a defendant's
violent but passionate response triggers the "heat of passion" defense
to murder, we ask whether the response was reasonable. 2° When
asking whether a defendant can invoke self-defense, we ask whether
the defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent threat of
unlawful bodily harm.2 °5 We even ask these questions when police
activity is under scrutiny. A police officer may use force to effect an
arrest only if its use is reasonable. 20 6 Furthermore, in deciding
whether a suspect invoked the right to counsel under Edward v.
Arizona, °7 the relevant inquiry is whether the suspect articulated his
desire to have counsel so that "a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an

202. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (labeling the standard set
forth in Terry an objective standard); see also United States v. Robinson, 30 F.3d 774,
782 (7th Cir. 1994) (characterizing Terry as an objective test); United States v.
Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. McKie,
951 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851,
857 (6th Cir. 1991) (same).
203. Scott, 436 U.S. at 137.
204. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103
(1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2 (1989) (amended 1994); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/9-2 (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 203 (West 1983) (amended 1995);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20 (West 1987) (amended 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4
(West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (Baldwin 1994) (amended 1996); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04 (West 1994).
205. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21 (1996); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/7-1 (West 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:19 (West 1986); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 108 (West 1983) (amended 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06
(West 1987) (amended 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
35.15 (McKinney 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (West 1994) (amended 1996);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.48 (West 1996).
206. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-610 (Michie 1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 776.05 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-3(1986) (amended 1996);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-5 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3215 (1995); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 107 (West 1983) (amended 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.06 (West 1987) (amended 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § C: 3-7 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 35.30 (McKinney 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51 (West 1994); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-403 (1995).
207. 451 U.S. 777 (1981).
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attorney., 20 8 For purposes of determining qualified immunity, courts
ask whether a reasonable officer could have believed that he had
probable cause to make the arrest in question. 2 9 To suggest, as the
Court does, that the "would" approach is subjective is misleading and
ignores the fact that reasonableness, or the reasonable person test, is a
prototypical objective standard.
The "would" standard does not examine the officer's subjective
ulterior motives but rather creates a proxy for these motives by
examining how a reasonable officer would behave when confronted
with similar circumstances. The Court nonetheless argues that the
"would" standard is subjective because it is driven by subjective
considerations. However, neither Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, nor
Macon stand for the proposition that subjective considerations
transform an objective standard into a subjective one. These cases
merely state that courts cannot inquire about the subjective motivations
of a particular officer. As stated above, the "would" standard avoids
this subjective inquiry. By asking whether a reasonable officer would
have made the arrest absent the pernicious ulterior motive, the courts
deliberately incorporate a Terry-like objective inquiry rather than
falling into the subjective pitfall that the Scott/VillamonteMarquezlMacon trilogy condemned.
Third, the Court noted that the "would" standard is unworkable.210
How should courts determine what a reasonable officer would do? By
looking at the practices of that officer? The practices of police
departments? Written policies? The practices among police departments
throughout the state? By looking at the length of time that the police
officer followed the suspect? By looking at whether officers are
members of some type of drug task force or whether they are more
generally charged with enforcing the traffic laws? While, admittedly,
courts have not answered these questions consistently, even intracircuit, 21' neither has there been complete disarray or anarchy among
courts that attempt to apply the "would" standard.
208. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994) (emphasis added).
209. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
210. See supra notes 151- 52. See also United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783,
787 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996).
2 11. For example, in the Tenth Circuit, more particularly in Utah, some courts focus
on past practices of the stopping officer. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
883 (Utah Ct. App.) (officer routinely pulls cars over for failing to properly use turning
signal), cert. denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). Other courts focus more broadly on the
practices of a particular police department. See, e.g., State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767,
770 n.10 (Utah 1990) (looking to local practices, court asked whether officers in the
area routinely stop cars for following too closely behind other cars).
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Generally, courts apply the "would" test in one of two ways,
although they tend to use "usual practices" as shorthand for both.21 2
The first examines practices in a particular locality, typically focusing
on a particular police department.1 3 Often relevant to this inquiry are
written regulations, 14 as well as a determination of whether practices
21 or the local modus operandi.1 16 The second focuses on
are routine 211
the behavior of the individual stopping officer, usually examining
whether the officer tends to stop vehicles for the infraction in
question. 1 7 Particularly relevant to the latter inquiry is whether the
police department specifically charged the officer with writing traffic
tickets or whether the officer has a particular, unrelated duty, such as
Officer Barney's affiliation with the drug task force in our
hypothetical. 8I While the courts have not consistently applied the
212. See generally 1 LAFAVE, supra note 82, § 1.4(e), at 115-26.
213. For cases within the Tenth Circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Greenspan, 26
F.3d 1001, 1005 (10th Cir. 1994) (practices of police department); United States v.
Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1994) (policy of police department to stop
vehicles for violations of the law regarding tinted windows); United States v. Deases,
918 F.2d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1990) (practices of highway patrol), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1233 (1991); United States v. Arnold, 898 F. Supp. 818, 821 (D. Kan. 1995) (ask
whether police routinely stop individuals for such violations); United States v.
Hernandez, 893 F. Supp. 952, 958 (D. Kan. 1995) (common practice of Kansas highway
patrol). For cases outside the Tenth Circuit, see, e.g., State v. Haskell, 645 A.2d 619,
621 (Me. 1994); State v. Bostic, 637 So.2d 591, 594 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Chapin, 879 P.2d 300, 305 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Santana Uscozo,
649 N.E.2d 717, 720 (Mass. 1995).
214. See United States v. McDonald, 65 F.3d 178 (10th Cir. 1995) (department
procedures), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991); State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1049
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (written departmental procedures), vacated, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah
1994). See also State v. Whitsell, 591 N.E.2d 265, 272-73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
215. United States v. Martinez, 983 F.2d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 922 (1993); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988),
overruled by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Neu, 879 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1989).
217. See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 1004, 1006 (10th Cir. 1993) (relying on
officer's testimony that he made traffic stops under particular circumstances); United
States v. Dirden, 38 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1994) (focusing on practice of stopping
officer); United States v. Sandoval, 829 F. Supp. 355, 359-60 (D. Utah 1993) (looking
at past history of particular officer), rev'd on other grounds, 29 F.3d 537 (10th Cir.
1994); State v. Apodaca, 814 P.2d 1030, 1032 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (relying on
officer's testimony about his practice of stopping vehicles for violations of safety belt
law), cert. denied, 813 P.2d 1018 (N.M. 1991). See also Alejandre v. State, 903 P.2d
794, 796 (Nev. 1995), overruled by Gama v. State, 920 P.2d 1018 (Nev. 1996); State v.
Vosseteig-Nash, No. 93-2187, 1994 WL 32319, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1994).
218. See, e.g., Alejandre, 903 P.2d at 797 (if an officer has no traffic related duties
and pulls over vehicle for a traffic offense, the court may deem the stop pretextual); but
see Miller v. State, 868 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (if the stopping officer's
duties do not include traffic stops, traffic stop is not necessarily pretextual), cert. denied
sub nom. Miller v. Arkansas, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994).
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"would" standard, vacillating between a more general examination of
local practices and a more specific examination of an individual's
practice, the standard is far from unworkable. Courts have developed
two ways to apply the standard: local versus the individual-hardly the
state of confusion that the "would" standard's opponents like to
portray.
But the viability of a legal test hinges on its ability to consistently
and predictably separate legal from illegal behavior, and application of
the "would" test has been wrought with inconsistency. However,
inconsistencies in application are not synonymous with problems in
the theoretical and constitutional underpinnings of the "would"
standard. Inconsistency may merely suggest that the standard needs to
be refined. The "reasonable officer" standard could be more
definitively constituted, a mere issue of modification and revision that
can take place within the confines of the "would" framework.
The more general, local practices mode is the most appropriate, and
focusing on practices in a particular locality is most logical. An
officer's decision to stop a vehicle for a traffic violation depends on
factors unique to a particular locality, including weather, speed limit,
terrain, visibility, and past accident history. Of course, as a member
of the local law enforcement team, a particular officer's past stopping
history is relevant in determining local practices, but it is not decisive.
A standard which encompassed more than a particular locality would
skew the reasonable officer by diluting the relevance of such local
characteristics. On the other hand, a narrower standard, one focusing
on a particular officer's past history, dangerously approaches the
purely subjective standard that has been definitively rejected.
In Whren, the Court states that linking the "would" standard to local
practices will make Fourth Amendment protections insufferably
variant. Yet, local practices and norms permeate, to greater and lesser
degrees, almost any reasonableness inquiry. Why is it more
problematic to determine whether a police officer acted according to
local practices in making a traffic stop than to determine whether an
investigative stop is rooted in reasonable suspicion? Reasonable
suspicion is a contextual construct. Suspicious activity in small-town
America may look different from suspicious activity in New York
City, and the Court has deliberately left the contours of the reasonable
suspicion requirement to local courts that are more closely connected to
the local context. Just as courts are adept at molding reasonable
suspicion to reflect a particular context, so would courts become adept
at scrutinizing traffic stops in terms of local practices.
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Furthermore, application of the "could" standard will breed inherent
confusion and inconsistency. Courts will inescapably be torn between
Terry, requiring reasonable suspicion before initiating an investigative
stop, and the "could" standard, which implicitly condones
investigative stops absent reasonable suspicion. This tension was
apparent in Botero-Ospina. On the one hand, the Botero-Ospinacourt
recognized that Terry's principles should govern. 9 On the other
hand, the court did not and could not rely on Terry in reaching its
decision. 220 Follow the "could" standard? Or follow Terry? This is
the irreconcilable dilemma that will confront courts bound by the
"could" standard. Thus confusion and inconsistency are inherent in
the "could" standard because that standard embodies a legal
contradiction.
The Court's fourth argument against the "would" standard is that a
distinct pretext doctrine is unnecessary because the Equal Protection
Clause serves to check arbitrary and discriminatory police power. 22,
In theory this argument has some weight, but in practice it does not.
The Equal Protection claim in this context would be a selective
enforcement claim. A selective enforcement claim is not an attack
on the merits of a criminal charge. 23 It is an affirmative defense224 or
serves as the basis for a collateral attack under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.225
While selective enforcement of criminal laws implicates the
Constitution,226 the proof threshold is formidable because of a strong
presumption in favor of prosecutorial discretion and, thus, that a
prosecutor has not violated the Equal Protection Clause. 27 A criminal
defendant must present "clear evidence to the contrary" to dispel these
219. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 786.
220. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 207 (1994).
222. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996); see also Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (selective prosecution claims governed by
equal protection standards). Selective enforcement and selective prosecution claims are
synonymous. See Buckenberger, supra note 95, at 492-94.
223. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486; see also Steven Alan Reiss, ProsecutorialIntent
in ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1987).
224. Reiss, supra note 223, at 1370 n.14.
225. Buckenberger, supra note 95, at 493.
226. See Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486; United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
125 (1979); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (explaining
that a decision to prosecute may not be based on "race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification").
227. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486.
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presumptions. 228 A selective enforcement claim demands proof of: 1)
discriminatory effect-does the enforcement of the traffic law have a
discriminatory effect? 229 and 2) discriminatory purpose or animus.23
A plaintiff faces a formidable burden of proof, especially with the
second prong.231 To satisfy the first prong, plaintiffs must show that:
similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.232
In general, plaintiffs may satisfy the first prong of the test through
reliance on statistical evidence regarding the frequency with which
others have been prosecuted. 233 But even this first prong becomes
difficult to prove when the object of a selective prosecution claim is a
traffic offense. Arrest records do not indicate when officers failed to
enforce laws,2 3 1 and traffic tickets do not generally have race or
ethnicity statistics.2 3 5 Even if non-enforcement statistics were
available, discovery is frequently a necessary predicate to proving that
similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted. Yet, in many
jurisdictions, discovery has been denied absent prima facie evidence of
discriminatory effect and purpose.236 Other jurisdictions have allowed

discovery upon a less stringent standard-a finding of a "colorable"

228. Id.
229. Id. at 1487. In the context of selective prosecution, this prong has been stated
as follows: "[T]hat, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded
against because of [the] conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against him,
he has been singled out for prosecution .
United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207,
1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
230. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487; see also Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (citing
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
23 1. Discriminatory animus requires proof of more than "awareness of
consequences." Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. Discriminatory animus requires that the
officer choose to prosecute or enforce a particular claim "'because of' not merely '[sic] in
spite of'its adverse effects on an identifiable group." Id. See also Reiss, supra note
223, at 1373, stating:
Because of the myriad of factors that could affect a prosecutor's decision to
bring charges, including the strength of the evidence, the culpability of the
offender, and the need to send our various enforcement signals, courts are
generally unwilling to infer a discriminatory intent from nonenforcement
statistics. Yet it is usually difficult to get evidence of discriminatory intent
beyond such statistics.
232. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487.
233. Reiss, supra note 223, at 1371-72 n.20-21.
234. Buckenberger, supra note 95, at 497.
235. Id. at 497 n.173.
236. See United States v. Parham, 16 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1990); St. German of Alaska Eastern
Orthodox Catholic Church v. United States, 840 F.2d 1087, 1095 (2d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978).
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claim.237 The Supreme Court opted for the more stringent standard
last term, requiring prima facie evidence of discriminatory effect: "We
think that the required threshold-a credible showing of different
treatment of similarly situated persons-adequately balances the
Government's interest in vigorous prosecution and the defendant's
interest in avoiding selective prosecution. 238
Selective enforcement claims can also fall prey to waiver rules and
procedural bars. In some jurisdictions, the selective enforcement claim
is waived as an affirmative defense if not raised prior to trial.23 9 A
criminal defendant may be collaterally estopped from bringing a postconviction section 1983 selective prosecution claim if he or she fails to
raise the claim at trial. 240 On the other hand, if a criminal defendant
unsuccessfully raises the defense at trial, then he or she may be
collaterally estopped from raising the same claim again. 241
In addition, the Supreme Court recently held that convicted and
incarcerated defendants may not bring a section 1983 damages claim
challenging the constitutionality of incarceration unless the defendant
first proves that the sentence has been invalidated.242 Thus, the
combination of stringent proof thresholds and procedural
impediments, both at the criminal trial and on collateral appeal,
transforms the conceptual nicety of the selective prosecution claim into
a vacuous remedy.
The most incisive argument against the "would" standard rests on
separation of powers principles. Legislative bodies should determine
the content of traffic laws; the executive (police) should enforce the
traffic laws; and federal courts (absent a valid selective enforcement
claim) should not become involved.243 In other words, courts should
237. United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995) and rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996); United States v.
P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 860 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d
1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140, 1146 (6th Cir.
1989); Attorney General of the United States v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 948
(D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury, 619 F.2d 1022, 1030 (3d Cir. 1980).
238. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983).
240. See, e.g., Green v. City of New York Med. Exam'r Office, 723 F. Supp. 973,
975-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
241. Buckenberger, supra note 95, at 498 n.177.
242. See Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).
243. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. See also United States v. BoteroOspina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[B]y abandoning the Guzman standard for
pretext, we rightly leave to the state legislatures the task of determining what the traffic
laws ought to be, and how those laws ought to be enforced."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2529 (1996); United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993) (by adopting
the "could" standard, "we assure [sic] that the courts leave to the legislatures the job of
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not tell police how and when to enforce democratically enacted traffic
laws.
This argument simply misperceives the breadth of the pretext
doctrine. The "would" standard does not impede or intrude upon
enforcement of the traffic laws. Unless a viable selective enforcement
claim emerges, which is relatively unlikely due to the difficulties
involved in enforcing such claims, 244 there is nothing unconstitutional
about the stop for the traffic offense and the issuance of a traffic
citation. Even under the "would" standard, police officers would be
free to enforce the traffic laws and even issue citations for violation of
those laws. 245 The "would" standard merely posits that officers,
judged against a reasonable officer standard, may not freely use the
enforcement of the traffic laws as a fishing expedition to search for
evidence to corroborate a more serious crime. If officers use traffic
offenses in that manner, it will be to no avail because the exclusionary
rule will bar introduction of the evidence.2'
Reconsider the anatomy of a pretextual stop.
(See Diagram II: Anatomy of Pretextual Auto Stop)
If one looks at a traffic stop in myopic terms, focusing solely on
steps B and C as represented in the box above, the traffic stop is
perfectly legitimate, and a traffic citation is an entirely appropriate
response. When one broadens the focus to include step A, the traffic
stop becomes one step in a larger process designed to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment and search for drugs. Depending on whether the
officer passes the "would" test, the fruits of this search may be
excluded as unconstitutional.
Otherwise stated, when a pretextual stop occurs, there are really two
simultaneous stops occurring. The officer stops for the more serious
crime-stop for drugs-without having reasonable suspicion for that
stop, and the officer stops for the traffic violation upon probable
cause. The former implicates the Fourth Amendment, and all evidence
determining what traffic laws police officers are authorized to enforce and when they are
authorized to enforce them"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994).
244. See supra notes 227-42 and accompanying text.
245. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Contrary
to the Government's argument, our approach will not 'severely' curtail 'the ability of
the New Mexico state police ... to enforce traffic laws.' No prosecution for violation of
a traffic regulation will be affected. Police officers may always issue appropriate
citations to drivers who violate traffic violations."), overruled by United States v.
Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995). See also Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 397 (Jones,
J., dissenting) ("Even in the most egregious case of pretext, I agree that the citizens can
be issued the citation for his traffic violation.").
246. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,487-88 (1963).
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Diagram II.
Anatomy of Pretextual Auto Stop

A. Officer lacks reasonable
suspicion to stop car for drugs
I
B. Reasonable suspicion (probable cause)
to stop for traffic violation
(failure to signal)
I
I
C. Stop for traffic violation
(failure to signal) -----Citation
I
D. Search for drugs:
- plain view
protective search of passengers
and passenger compartment
* search pursuant to arrest
* develop reasonable suspicion in process
of checking driver's license and vehicle
registration; detain for further questioning;
develop probable cause for arrest and/ or search
*consent to search
I
I
E. Seize drugs and arrest
for possession

F. Motion to suppress drugs
in trial for drug crime
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searched and seized in its wake should become a casualty of the
exclusionary rule. But the latter stop, that which is represented in the
box in Diagram II, is valid and would remain untouched even if the
Court had accepted the "would" approach. The officer's ability to
issue a citation, or otherwise do what would be done in the wake of a
pure traffic stop, is not at all hindered through use of the "would"
standard. Police officers may not choose to enforce minor traffic
violations when precluded from introducing the fruits of such
searches. 247 Nonetheless, they retained the option of doing so, even in
a jurisdiction that followed the "would" test. "Eliminating the search
incentive is not tantamount to barring the issuance of traffic
tickets. 248
Whren bolsters its conclusion by assailing the "would" standard.
Upon closer examination, the strength of such arguments dissipate.
Whren stands alone on its affirmative conclusion that probable cause
for a traffic violation per se satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements.
We are left with a decision that functionally transforms this probable
cause into reasonable suspicion for the more serious drug offense. We
are left without Terry.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whren may have been the inescapable, albeit lamentable, tragedy of
happenstance. This Article examines automobile stops. In that
context, both investigative impulses and impulses to enforce traffic
laws play out in identical ways-stopping (seizing) an automobile and
its passengers. This complete congruity makes the stop virtually
impossible to parse. Thus, on a blank slate, the most promising
resolution to the pretext problem lies at a point beyond the initial stop,
during any subsequent search or seizure that may follow the stop,
where the distinctness of the investigative stop and the traffic stop may
again manifest itself. Yes, Terry's second prong, the prong limiting
the scope of searches and seizures in the wake of a stop, would have
been the most appropriate place to locate a solution to the pretext
problem.
Yet, in the context of a traffic stop, little is left of Terry's second
prong. Robinson and Gustafson sanctioned searches incident to arrest
for a traffic violation.24 9 New York v. Belton expanded the scope of a
247. Buckenberger, supra note 95, at 490.
248. Id.
249. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); see supra
notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
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search incident to an arrest to include the entire passenger compartment
of a car, including all containers therein.
Michigan v. Long held
that Terry's stop-and-frisk principles sanctioned Erotective searches of
the whole passenger compartment of the car.
Coolidge v. New
Hampshire allowed for seizure of all items in plain view of a stopping
officer. 25 2 By expanding the scope of permissible searches and
seizures and affirmatively opting not to treat traffic stops as a unique
genre, the Court in these cases effectively precluded itself from
combating pretextual traffic stops through narrowly circumscribing
ensuing searches and seizures.
Absent a desire to topple decades of precedent, the Court in Whren
encountered a sub-optimal landscape for its decision. Whether the
Court adopted the "would" or "could" approach, it inevitably had to
locate its decision in Terry's first prong. When faced with two
admittedly sub-optimal alternatives, the Court chose the one that
rendered Terry's first prong vacuous.
When we allow the police carte blanche authority to use minor
traffic violations as a pretext to stop an individual to search for
evidence to support reasonable suspicion of a more serious crime, we
nullify Terry's first prong. We sanction investigatory auto stops on a
standard less stringent than reasonable suspicion-in fact on the basis
of a standard that we all meet almost every time we enter a car-a
minor traffic offense. And we remove that lone remaining, yet
fundamentally important, barrier between the state and an individual
who happens to be traveling on this country's roads. The Supreme
Court's adoption of the "could" test in Whren means that we all
become prey to police officers' arbitrary whims, hunches, suspicions,
and prejudices. As students of the law, we realize that the reach of our
constitutional rights is limited-that the Constitution has its bounds.
What we probably did not realize is those bounds are now as close as
the end of our driveways.

250.
251.
252.

453 U.S. 454 (1981). See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
403 U.S. 443 (1971). See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.

